To provide knowledge needed to understand the economic underpinnings of non-market decision-making (knowledge and understanding); to prepare students to apply, in a critical and original fashion, what is learnt to the analysis of national and international policies (applying knowledge and understanding).
To stimulate students to exercise theif critical skills so that they are capable to identify the main assumptions of the theory, the instruments adopted and the limits of the theory. The goal is to make students able to integrate the knowledge acquired and apply it to the analysis of institutions and political processes, getting ready for the job market. To prepare student to interpret data to develop critical analysis skills (Making judgments).
To foster the ability of students of exposition of personal opinions to experts as well as a non-specialized public (Communication skills).
To stimulate students to study autonomously and communicate their knowledge clearly (Learning skills).
Lessons in classroom; seminars by invoted speakers
None. Students are hower encouraged to review basic microeconomics.
Not mandatory
Public choice applies the economic pronciples to the political deicision-making process. Among the topics illustrated in the course are: the role and the function of the government, the decision-making process of the government and of the actors that take decisions and implement them; the decision-making mechanisms in direct democracy; electoral competition; the relationship between private and public interests; the relationship electors-politicians and politicians-bureaucrats; the effect of the evolution of governemnts; the politcal business cycles; normative aspect of collective decision rules.
Mueller, Dennis, Public Choice III. Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Slides of lectures will be weekly provided in Studium and will integrate the textbook. Additional (not mandatory) scientific papers could be provided during the course.
Argomenti | Riferimenti testi | |
1 | Introduction to public choice. Origins of the state: public goods and prisoner's dilemma | Pages 1-12 |
2 | Origins of the state: public goods and coordination games | Pages 13-18 |
3 | Voluntary supply of public goods and externalities | Pages 18-27 |
4 | Coase theorem; experimental analysis of voluntary supply of public goods | Pages 27-30; 40-42 |
5 | Reasons for collective choice: redistribution | Pages 44-56 |
6 | Unanimity rule | Pages 67-78 |
7 | Majority rule: positive properties | Pages 79-85 |
8 | The median voter theorem | Pages 85-92 |
9 | Logrolling; agenda manipulation | Pages 104-107, 112-117 |
10 | Majority rule: normative properties | Pages 128-135, 136-144 |
11 | Alternatives to majority rule | Pages 147-157 |
12 | Theory of clubs; voting with the feet | Pages 182-189, 199-202 |
13 | Federalism | Pages 209-215 |
14 | Intergovernmental grants | Pages 215-228 |
15 | Electoral competition with deterministic voting | Pages 230-236, 241-246 |
16 | Electoral competition with probabilistic voting | Pages 252-260 |
17 | Multiparty systems | Pages 264-284 |
18 | The paradox of voting | Pages 303-329 |
19 | Rent-seeking | Pages 333-338, 340-357 |
20 | Bureaucracy | Pages 359-365 |
21 | Extensions of Niskanen model | Pages 365-373 |
22 | Legislative decision making in Europe | Pages 386-388, 399-405 |
23 | Political competition and macroeconomics | Pages 429, 437-459 |
24 | Voter behavior, deficits | Pages 459-470 |
25 | Interest groups | Pages 472-497 |
26 | The size of government | Pages 501-529 |
27 | Social welfare functions | Pages 563-578 |
28 | Arrow's theorem | Pages 582-595 |
29 | A theory of justice | Pages 597-613 |
30 | Review of the course |
Written exam. Students should prove that they have understood the theoretical issue indicated in the question and be able to demonstrate the result, if requested.